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Martin Luther King’s Reaction to
the Cuban Missile Crisis
Leonardo Campus
1 This research article will focus on the reaction of Martin Luther King Jr. to the Cuban
missile  crisis  of  October  19621,  including  the  presentation  of  a  previously  unknown
document of particular relevance on such a topic – i.e.  a private letter from King to
President Kennedy regarding his handling of the situation - and reflecting on some of the
aspects raised by the evidence, with particular regard to the relationship between the two
leaders.
2 As is well-known, the Cuban missile crisis occurred after the Soviet Union – under the
leadership of Nikita S. Khrushchev – secretly deployed medium and intermediate-range
nuclear  missiles  in  Cuba.  The  discovery  of  these  installations  by  U-2  photo-
reconnaissance missions (October 16, 1962), led the US government under the Kennedy
Administration  to  impose  a  naval  blockade  on  Cuba  -  euphemistically  called  a
“quarantine” to give it an appearance of international legality. This was accompanied by
an official request for the removal of the missiles already in Cuba, and an explicit threat
of a “full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union”, should any of those missiles be
launched.  Such  policy  was  announced  by  President  Kennedy  in  a  TV address  on  22
October 1962.2 On 28 October,  after days of  extreme international  tension and a real
danger of escalation3,  Khrushchev suddenly agreed to remove the missiles, under two
conditions.  One,  an American guarantee that it  would not invade Cuba;  and two, the
removal  of  US nuclear  missiles  from Turkey after  a  few months  (this  condition was
secretly conceded by Kennedy).The crisis was later defined by historian (and Kennedy’s
aide) Arthur Schlesinger, Jr as “the most dangerous moment in human history”4.
 
1.1 DR. KING’S REACTION 
3 Martin Luther King’s reaction to the Cuban crisis was initially dealt with in the context of
an article by this author that first investigated the African Americans’ responses to said
nuclear crisis5. While we refer to that paper for a picture on that general context, here it
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must be recalled that the overall reaction among African Americans was one of solid and
widespread support – consistent with that of general American public opinion6, but in
measures and tones that may appear remarkable considering the unprecedented dangers
that the crisis implicated and the harsh struggle for civil rights that was then ongoing on
the domestic front.  More specifically,  said reactions tended to combine a widespread
support  for  the  President  in  a  time  of  national  crisis  with  a  strong  desire  for  the
preservation of peace.
4 In this context, the position taken by Martin Luther King occupies a special and fitting
place. Special for its relevance, given the fact that at the time, while he had not yet been
awarded a Nobel prize, he was already the best known activist and the most influential
leader of  the civil  rights movement.  Fitting because the views he expressed,  if  more
elaborated  and  nuanced,  appear  consistent  with  the  reactions  of  approval  recorded
among the majority of the African American public. 
5 King’s few public statements on the crisis are to be found in the pages of the so-called
black press. The Harlem weekly “New York Amsterdam News”, for instance, reported that
“Rev. Martin Luther King, in New York to address a testimonial dinner, called for special
prayers for the President. ‘In these critical days we need broad understanding and a faith
in the future so that the dream of peace may become a lasting reality’.”7 We see here the
‘dream’  image that  would later  resurface in his  well-known speech at  the march on
Washington. Apparently it was a picture that lay already in the heart of the pastor from
Georgia.  Content-wise,  his  statement was cautious but  supportive,  while  unwilling to
define his position on the specific measures taken by Kennedy.
6 On October 24, 1962, as he was invited to speak at the Harvard Law School (a location that
might have been receptive to the expression of doubts on the handling of the Cuban
crisis), King was careful to stick to the theme of his speech, “The future of integration”,
without touching on the international situation8.  He also declined an approach by an
emissary of the local student movement for nuclear disarmament – the “Tocsin” – to
combine his rally with their own and address them jointly9. It is entirely plausible that
the rationale for this refusal was to avoid to be dragged into a protest debate against
White House foreign policy. 
7 In  another  comment  of  those  days,  King,  after  confirming  to  the  interviewer  the
inevitability of correlation between the international crisis and the domestic struggle for
civil rights, added laconically: “I am convinced that the U.S. must take a moral offensive
as well as military offensive”.10 
8 As can be seen, all the declarations that King released during the course of the crisis were
brief and without hints of dissent, and while not being enthusiastic, they steered clear of
raising objections. This however was not due to any tendency to court the administration,
as confirmed by both his previous public condemnation of the Bay of Pigs invasion (which
had taken the form of a strongly critical statement and a signed petition)11 and his later
protest of the US war in Vietnam (expressed on several occasions, including his famous
speech of April 4, 1967)12. Apparently, he was simply convinced that the government did
not deserve to be criticized in this specific case.
9 On January 5, 1963, a few weeks after the crisis was solved, King returned to the subject in
the column he penned twice a month for the “New York Amsterdam News”. This time his
reflections were more extensively articulated:
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Everyone of us knows full well that we came dreadfully close to the precipice of
nuclear  war  in  1962.  There  is  grave  danger,  however,  that  our  “success”13 in
handling the Cuban Missile Crisis could be misused. We must not allow the delicate
balance that has been established in matters of foreign policy to be destroyed by
our arrogance. We would hope that since near disaster has been avoided, America
would  in  humility  readily  grasp  the  opportunity  to  make  a  determined  bid  for
peaceful  co-existence.  (…)  now  is  the  time  for  us  to  concretely  seek  common
agreement on nuclear testing and disarmament. (…) In truth, what more worthy
objective could the whole brunt of our energies in foreign policy be expended?14
10 As lucid and sensible as these words may seem, they went against the prevailing trend of
triumphant  lessons  being drawn from the  outcome of  the  crisis.  According to  those
opinions, the Soviets had ended up backing down unconditionally as soon as the US had
raised their  tone,  making clear they meant business15.  King warned such a view was
dangerous. Moreover, he appeared to have been a good prophet, not only because the
Soviets had actually gained more from the agreement than was publicly known at the
time,  thus  confuting  the  claims  of  a  total  US  triumph,  but  even  more  so  since  an
international treaty on nuclear tests was effectively achieved a few months later, and
détente was the course that Washington and Moscow chose in 196316. 
11 Finally, a less relevant mention of the Cuban crisis is to be found in passing in an article
on civil rights that King published in the spring of 1963.17
 
1.2 THE LETTER TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY
12 These views that King expressed publicly on the missile crisis may now be integrated with
a previously unknown document that was recently unearthed. It is a private letter from
Martin Luther King to President Kennedy on the Cuban missile crisis, that was sent “only
a few weeks after [its] resolution”. Two copies were found. One is attached to a letter that
King’s  aide  Stanley  Levison  sent  shortly  before  his  death  to  historian  (and  former
Kennedy advisor) Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.. In attaching it, Levison notes: “This has never
been made public and I believe aside from myself no one else has seen it”.18
13 The other copy is enclosed in a letter that Clarence B Jones,  King’s lawyer and close
advisor, sent him on November 1st 1962 (i.e., four days after the crisis had eased) to urge
him to share with the President his comments on said event19.  To this end, Clarence
prepared for King a draft letter, here quoted in its essential parts. 
Because so often as a spokesman for civil  rights I  have written you to press for
programs we felt to be urgent, my personal observations on other subjects, as a
private American citizen, have necessarily been limited. 
14 King had written Kennedy at least six times since his term began (on March 1, March 16
and December 17, 1961; on March 30, August 2 and August 31, 1962)20. Issues related to
civil rights were indeed the main topic discussed in all of them.21
The resolution of  the Cuba crisis  with its  immense implications  is,  however,  so
important, I am eager to express my personal reactions. 
At a time when so many are saying that the most impressive achievement is the
result, I find myself as much impressed by the method. 
By method I do not mean “firmness” or any of the other oversimplified descriptions
which mislead rather than clarify. Putting aside the issue of blockade, it was the
larger scheme of your basic design which was singular in diplomatic art. 
The original quality was in the opportunity it provided for choices to this adversary
which could evoke constructive responses. In precisely measuring consequences,
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the architecture of your initiative,  by planning for a not dishonorable doorway,
served to bring out a positive quality in Mr. Khrushchev. 
15 During the course of the crisis Kennedy surely took various steps to allow Khrushchev a
way to retreat honorably, though most of them were not publicly known at the time22, so
here the letter probably referred to the choice of a blockade rather than of a direct air
strike, and to the tone of the public messages exchanged with Khrushchev during the
crisis.
(…) Finally, in resisting any impulses to overestimate or overstate results, you gave
your adversary an opportunity to count some gain, thereby obviating a psychology
of desperation. 
16 This refers to the input given by Kennedy to the government and the reporters not to
gloat  over  the  crisis  outcome,  lest  Khrushchev  feel  humiliated  and  refuted  the
compromise reached.23 This reference in the letter closely recalls what King will publicly
write a few weeks later in the above-mentioned article for the “New York Amsterdam
News” (see above).24
This  laid  a  firm  basis  for  future  negotiations.  Equally,  your  fair  and  generous
characterization  of  Mr.  Khrushchev’s  responses  as  “statesmanlike”  created  an
example for him.
In  the  combination  of  these  approaches,  I  feel  you  have  utilized  some  of  the
elements of non-violent creativity in international conflict, despite the presence of
latent  force.  Non-violent  resistance  has  so  much  spiritual  power  because  it
unremittingly  pursues  its  goal  and  yet  it  recognizes  that  every  opponent
somewhere has  a  receptive  syndrome which may lead to  reconciliation,  even if
presently limited in dimension.
Something vastly more important seems to have occurred than a bases-invasion
quid pro quo. You may well have reached into the deep recesses of a divided world
and found a bridge of accommodation (…) A world armed and over-armed on both
sides with ultimate weapons cannot find security or survival in multiplied power.
Hope is only in the realization that there is a final point of restraint both sides must
observe.
I hope you will continue, despite contrary pressures, to pursue the difficult quest
for settlements (…). 
In this direction may be the greatest achievement of the twentieth century – the
emergence of statesmen who are equal to the colossal risks a racing technology has
imposed upon the world. (…)
17 Was  this  letter  eventually  sent?  Did  King  just  sign  the  draft,  without  modifying  its
substance? And did Kennedy ever reply to it? Levison’s letter shows no doubt on such
questions. He writes that the “letter” (not draft) was “sent”, and adds: “I am trying to get
Kennedy’s response from Martin’s still unprocessed papers. Dora, Martin’s secretary, was
to send me the reply at the time but it was sidetracked and I never saw it nor do I know
the  nature  of  his  response”25.  Nor  has  Clarence  B  Jones  himself  ever  expressed  any
contrary opinion, in our repeated email exchanges on the subject, though unwilling to
provide further details26. Besides, King usually valued Jones’ advices, defining him “a man
of sound judgment, deep insights, and great dedication”.27 This seems confirmed also by
the various important tasks he performed in the years (1960-1968) in which he worked
for dr. King, a number of which were as a contributing speechwriter.28
18 On  the  other  hand,  it  is  also  not  impossible  that  this  specific  Jones’  initiative  was
eventually put aside by King for some reason, and that later Levison in all good faith
mistook a  draft  for  a  delivered letter.  In  this  sense,  the fact  that  Schlesinger,  while
receiving the letter, did not pursue its publication29 and the fact that, more recently, a
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footnote of Volume VII of Dr. King’s papers edition passingly referred to the item as a “
draft statement”,30 rather than as a letter, may suggest prudence in considering the text
as surely sent, or sent in this form31. 
19 However, the letter appears fully consistent with King’s other comments on the crisis, as
discussed above. Also, Jones writes to King that his “suggested text incorporates thoughts
you have expressed on this subject”32.  This remark grants relevance to the document
even should one suppose that it was not eventually sent or that it was sent in modified
form, because it would still  contribute to shedding more light on King’s views of the
Cuban crisis. 
20 
A few points of the text must be highlighted. King’s description (via Jones) of Kennedy’s
policy  as  an  example  of  “non-violent  creativity  in  international  conflict”  is  surely
striking, considering that such actions - no matter how politically comprehensible in light
of the Soviet provocation and how less drastic than other alternatives considered in the
Ex-Comm33 such  as  air-strikes  or  invasion  of  Cuba  -  included  military  measures  (of
dubious international  legality)  which contributed significantly to the most dangerous
nuclear crisis  that  ever occurred34.  This  explains the immediate mitigation of  such a
statement (“despite the presence of latent force”) and the veiled doubts expressed on the
use  of  a  naval  blockade  (“putting  aside  the  issue  of  blockade”)  and  on  common
oversimplifications regarding the presumed benefits of firmness (a term significantly put
between quotation marks,  just  as the term ‘success’  in his  later article on the crisis,
mentioned  above).  King’s  use  of  “despite”  and  “putting  aside”  to  characterize  the
blockade and the threatened use of force, instead of “in force of them” or “thanks to their
combination  with  negotiation”  marks  an  implicit  yet  significant  difference  with  the
prevailing interpretation of Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban crisis, widely seen in those
days as a perfect mix of diplomacy and military power.
21 Still,  such a passionate support of Kennedy’s handling of the crisis was not one to be
taken  for  granted,  coming  from  a  leader  who  only  months  before  had  publicly
condemned the White House for the Bay of Pigs invasion, besides having criticized it as
well for its reluctance to act on civil rights issues35. 
22 At the same time, the text correctly emphasized the deep symbolic and political value of
compromise with the adversary and of the way it was reached.(which had indeed points
in common with King’s previous definitions of nonviolent principles36).The general aim of
the letter seemed to convey to the President a word of personal, even spiritual backing,
encouraging him to pursue détente “despite contrary pressures”37. Eventually this would
prove to be the path Kennedy took in the final months of his presidency.
 
1.3 DR.KING’S NONVIOLENCE 
23 Moreover, should it be confirmed that it was sent in this form, the letter would also 
provide evidence of the fact that King promoted non-violent methods (or what he saw as
such) not only in civil rights issues (a field in which he personally practiced them) but
also in the field of international relations. As he had written at the time of the Bay of Pigs,
“I am as concerned about International affairs as I am about the civil rights struggle in
the United States”.38 
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24 King had first discovered Gandhian non-violent methods as a student of theology in the
spring of 1950, successfully practiced them in the Montgomery bus-boycott in 1955-1956
and further absorbed and embraced them after his trip to India in 1959.39 In foreign
affairs, he had consistently favored nuclear disarmament and opposed nuclear tests at
least since December 1957. In an article of January 1962 King defined “non-violence in the
nuclear age” as “life’s last chance”.40 
25 Moreover, Dr.King’s insistence on the importance of non-violence in foreign affairs and
on seeking “common agreement on nuclear testing and disarmament” (to use King’s
exact words taken from his above-mentioned article on the New York Amsterdam News)
seems perfectly consistent also with the growing ‘anti-Bomb’ efforts carried out a the
time by women, liberal and pacifist groups (such as the War Resisters League41), joined by
large  portions  of  African-Americans  civil  rights  activists  who  had  been  fighting
consistently for such issues since 194542. This meant that activists of said groups often
campaigned for both goals: race equality at home and nuclear détente abroad43, seeing
them as closely linked, through the issue of colonialism.44
26 This can also be seen in an ‘intermestic’ perspective (i.e, international + domestic)45. Not
in the sense that partisan internal politics influenced the handling of foreign affairs by
leaders, but on the contrary in the sense that groups pressing for desegregation at home
were also campaigning for a stop to the arms race and for détente in foreign affairs,
seeing the two issues as linked46. In this regard the position assumed by King (via Jones) in
this letter would appear emblematic.
27 .
28 Incidentally, regarding the interconnections between issues of colonialism, foreign affairs
and race relations, it should be added that in mid-October King had a long and warm
meeting with Ben Bella, the leader of the newly decolonized country of Algeria. As King
himself  revealed in an article  published in the midst  of  the nuclear crisis,47 the two
leaders discussed ‘issues ranging from the efficacy of non violence to the Cuban crisis’.48
While not implying any causal connection, the fact that in those same weeks King had
discussed the usefulness of non-violence with a prominent foreign leader can be seen as a
further confirmation that the topic was indeed particularly present and relevant in King’s
mind also in that very period. 
29 Last, the Cuban missile crisis spurred theoretical reflections on nonviolence and on the
moral dilemmas of political ethics in the nuclear era also among several other clergy
members  and theologians  of  different  confessions,  both in the US and abroad.49 The
variety of their reactions confirms the value of a study of the so far neglected socio-
cultural dimension of said crisis,  based on ways it  was perceived and the reactions it
produced. 
 
1.4 THE RELATIONSHIP WITH KENNEDY
30 The letter may also prove significant for what it tells us on the relations between King
and Kennedy on two major points. 
31 First,  King  seemed  convinced  that  he  and  the  President  shared  a  similar  idea  of
leadership:  not  one  of  simple  firmness  or  machismo towards  the  opponent,  but  one
seeking solutions through negotiation, though with a boldness to take risks to bring those
results about. This is plainly evident in King’s methods to force racial integration on US
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society  through  actions  of  civil  disobedience  but  without  recurring  to  violence  (in
contrast  with  the  radical  approach of  other  civil  rights  leaders  refuting  the  goal  of
integration  and  accepting  violent  protests);  and  evident  in  Kennedy’s  resistance  to
pressures coming from the “hawks” in the Ex-Comm and in the Pentagon for ordering a
military attack in the Cuban crisis50, in his refusal to accept the widespread equivalence
between “negotiation with enemy” and “appeasement”, and in his repeated recourse to
back-channel  negotiators  in  order  to  peacefully  defuse  standoff  situations  with
Khrushchev (such as sending his brother Robert to talk secretly with the Soviet agent
Georgi Bolshakov during the crisis at Berlin’s Checkpoint Charlie in 1961, or with the
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on October 27 at the peak of the Cuban crisis, in
addition to pre-alerting the academic Andrew Cordier as conveyer of a secret message to
UN Secretary  U  Thant  containing  the  proposal  for  the  compromise51).  Even  without
knowing all of these details, King notices and praises this attitude by Kennedy perhaps
even more because he knew how the political milieu at the White House and in foreign
policy  circles  was  then centered on an ideology exalting toughness  and masculinity,
rather than virtues of restraint, moderation or wise prudence, as historian Robert Dean
has demonstrated.52 
32 Second,  King  appeared  to  have  a  fundamental  and  growing  trust  in  Kennedy  (who
reciprocated it), in spite of all the frustrations and criticisms over his reluctance to act
resolutely on civil rights issues53. King was convinced that JFK’s quality as a leader was
evolving,  becoming  bolder.  As  he  will  explain  after  the  President’s  assassination,  he
believed he had known two different John Kennedys. “One”, he said, “presided in the first
two years under pressure of the uncertainty caused by his razor-thin margin of victory.
In 1963, a new Kennedy had emerged. He had found that public opinion was not in a rigid
mold. He was,  at his death, undergoing a transformation from a hesitant leader with
unsure goals to a strong figure with deeply appealing objectives.”54 Obviously King could
cooperate  more  with  this  second,  bolder  Kennedy  and  over  the  course  of  1963  his
relations with the President grew stronger, being based on a deeper mutual trust in each
other’s commitment55. And as one reads this letter of praise where King says (or at least is
claimed by Jones) to be “most impressed” by the President’s methods, one cannot help
but think that Kennedy’s efforts to avoid an escalation in the Cuban crisis played an
important, early role in shaping this idea of an evolving Presidential leader in King’s
mind. So it can be argued that Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban crisis is likely to have
been one of  the major steps that contributed to the late (re)assessment of  President
Kennedy by Martin Luther King, of course together with his later TV address of 11 June
1963 on civil rights as a moral issue the country needed to confront.56 Levison’s words to
Schlesinger also points in the same direction of an evolving relationship between the two
leaders.57 
33 Future publications58 might be in a position to add new elements clarifying the letter’s
practical context,  or to locate the presidential reply claimed by Levison59.  Until  then,
clearly a degree of prudence remains advisable before automatically attributing to King
every term of this draft letter (as we currently have only one source - his trusted aide
Levison - claiming it was sent in that form, though none has denied it either). It seems
already useful, however, to present this new document with all the elements currently
available,  considering its obvious relevance, for its content,  the leaders involved, and
because it integrates the picture of Dr. King’s reactions to the crisis and his relationship
with President Kennedy. 
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34 .
35 As for  the other positions taken by King on the Cuban crisis,  they are also of  great
interest, as discussed above (Section 1.1). They stand out in particular for their initial
laconic prudence and their absence of criticism of Kennedy during the crisis (at that
critical juncture, King appears to see the President as someone to pray for, rather than
someone to judge or debate upon), and later for their political lucidity in warning against
any indulgence in national  arrogance or  self-complacency while  pointing toward the
post-crisis  new  opportunities  of  fruitful  negotiations  for  nuclear  disarmament  and
détente.
36 ---
37 Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Raffaella Baritono for kindly discussing with me
a first draft of this article. 
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ABSTRACTS
This research article deals for the first time with the reaction of Martin Luther King Jr. to the
Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. In doing so, it also presents a document of special relevance:
the draft of a previously-unknown private letter from dr. King to President Kennedy, in which
the  civil  rights  leader  praised  Kennedy’s  management  of  that  crucial  nuclear  confrontation
between US and USSR and saw in it the potential for détente. The paper reflects on the elements
currently  available  for  the  interpretation  of  this  piece  of  evidence  and,  with  regard  to  the
relationship between the two leaders, it argues that the way Kennedy handled the Cuban crisis
Martin Luther King’s Reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis
European journal of American studies, 12-2 | 2017
14
may  well  have  played  a  role  in  Dr.  King’s  reassessment  of  Kennedy’s  evolving  qualities  of
leadership - a view that King will further develop over the course of 1963 (in the most fruitful
months of their cooperation) and will express after Dallas.
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